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In recent years, there has been a renewed interest in the role of consumption exter-
nalities in macroeconomic dynamics. The basic assumption of this literature is that
consumers’ felicity depends not only on their private consumption but also on the
average consumption in the economy at large. The presence of such a psychological
external eﬀect may alter saving behaviors of consumers and thus dynamic property
of the model economy. The existing studies have inspected the eﬀects of consump-
tion externalities in the context of asset pricing (Abel 1990 and Gal´ ı 1994), optimal
taxation (Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000), equilibrium eﬃciency (Alonso-Carrera et al.
2003, Liu and Turnovsky 2005 and Nakamoto 2009), indeterminacy and sunspots
(Weder 2000), and long-term economic growth (Carroll et al. 1997 and 2000, and
Harbaugh 1996).1
One of the key features of this literature is that most of the foregoing studies
employ representative agent models. In the representative-agent economies, the so-
cial average consumption coincides with the level of private consumption, so that
the presence of consumption externalities aﬀects aggregate dynamics in a quanti-
tative manner rather than in a qualitative manner: the dynamic behavior of the
model economy with consumption externalities is essentially the same as that of
the economy without external eﬀects. Furthermore, it has been well-known that, in
the Ramsey model with inelastic labor supply, the steady-state levels of aggregate
capital and aggregate consumption are not aﬀected by the presence of consumption
externalities.2
1Some of the existing studies such as Ljunavust and Uhlig (2000) and Carroll et al. (1997 and
2000) assume the external habit formation in which the benchmark consumption is given by a
weighted average of past levels of the average consumption in the economy. Unlike the internal
habit formation, consumers consider that the benchmark consumption is not aﬀected by their
own consumption behavior under the external habit formation hypothesis. Thus this assumption
represents consumption externalities with time delay rather than (internal) habit formation under
which each agent takes its past consumption into account when deciding its optimal saving plans.
2See Fisher and Hof (2000).
2Unlike the mainstream literature on dynamic macroeconomic analysis with con-
sumption externalities, the present paper explores the eﬀects of consumption ex-
ternalities in a model of capital accumulation with heterogeneous agents. We con-
struct a neoclassical growth model in which there are two groups of inﬁnitely lived
households. Each group of households diﬀers in their initial wealth holding and in
their preference structure as to consumption external eﬀects. In this setting, ex-
ternal eﬀects of consumption among the consumers are more complex than in the
representative-agent counterpart, because the presence of consumption externalities
may have distributional eﬀects that is inevitably absent in the representative agent
modelling.
More speciﬁcally, we distinguish intergroup externalities from intragroup exter-
nalities. Namely, we assume that a household may react diﬀerently in response to
changes in the average consumption in her own group and that in the other group.
For example, an agent would feel jealousy as to other members in her own group
but would admire consumption behavior of other group’s members. We assume the
presence of such kind of asymmetric external eﬀects in order to inspect how the dif-
ferent forms of external eﬀects among the households aﬀect wealth distribution and
aggregate dynamics of the economy.
As it turns out, the steady state of aggregate economy is the same as that of the
standard Ramsey model without consumption externalities. In addition, as well as
in the standard model without externalities, the steady-state distribution of wealth
is history dependent, that is, the long-run wealth distribution depends on the initial
distribution of wealth among the agents. It is, however, demonstrated that dynamic
behavior of the model economy towards the steady state is highly sensitive to the
consumption external eﬀects. In particular, in addition to the initial condition,
the speciﬁcation of consumers’ preferences with respect to external eﬀects plays a
critical role in determining the stationary distribution of wealth. We carefully inspect
how the strength and direction of intergroup as well as intragroup external eﬀects
determine the equilibrium trajectory of the economy leading to a speciﬁc stationary
distribution of wealth.
3It is to be noted that our study is closely related to Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and Turnovsky
(2008). These authors also examine a heterogeneous-agent model of neoclassical
growth with consumption externalities. On the one hand, the model used by Garc´ ıa-
Pe˜ nalosa and Turnovsky (2008) is more general than ours because their model allows
variable labor supply, while our model does not. On the other hand, they assume
that the utility function is identical for all agents and satisﬁes quasi-homotheticity.
Given this restriction, the aggregate dynamics of the model economy is independent
of wealth distribution so that Garc´ ıa-Pe˜ nalosa and Turnovsky (2008) can focus on
the distribution dynamics under a given pattern of macroeconomic dynamics. As
emphasized above, since our model assumes that the external eﬀects are asymmetric
between the two groups of agents, the aggregate dynamics of macroeconomy depends
on the wealth distribution. Hence, the contribution of our investigation is to examine
distributional eﬀect of consumption externalities in a general situation under which
dynamic behavior of the macroeconomy cannot be separated from personal wealth
distribution.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the theo-
retical framework and Section 3 characterizes the steady-state equilibrium. Section
4 presents a detailed discussion on the relation between consumption externalities
and the stationary distribution of wealth. Section 5 gives some discussions for our
ﬁndings. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Suppose that there are two groups of inﬁnitely-lived agents. Each group consists of
a continuum of identical households who have the same form of instantaneous utility
function and an identical rate of time preference. The felicity function and the initial
holding of wealth of the representative household in each group are diﬀerent from
each other. For simplicity, we assume that population in the economy is constant
4over time and, therefore, the mass of each group will not change. We also assume
that the economy is closed and the stock of capital is the only net asset held by
agents.
The representative agent in group i (i = 1,2) supplies one unit of labor in each
moment and maximizes a discounted sum of utilities over an inﬁnite time horizon.






i(ci,Ci,Cj)dt, ρ > 0, i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j. (1)
In the above, ρ denotes a given rate of time discount, ci private consumption of group
i agent, and Ci and Cj respectively represent the average levels of consumption in
groups i and j. The instantaneous utility function, ui(·), is assumed to be monoton-
ically increasing and strictly concave in private consumption, ci. It is also assumed
that in the symmetric equilibrium where C ≡ ci = C1 = C2, the utility function
holds the Inada conditions: limC→0 ui
1(C,C,C) = ∞ and limC→∞ ui
1(C,C,C) = 0,
where ui
m (·) (m = 1,2, 3) denotes the partial derivative of the utility function with
respective to the m-th variable in ui (·).
The key assumption about the instantaneous felicity function in (1) is that we
distinguish intragroup externalities from intergroup externalities. That is, an agent’s
concern with the consumption levels of members in her own group may be diﬀer-
ent from the concern with consumption of agents in the other group. Following the
taxonomy given by Dupor and Liu (2003), the external eﬀect of consumption on an
individual utility may be either negative (jealousy) or positive (admiration). In addi-
tion, each consumer is a conformist who likes being similar to others (keeping up with
the Joneses) or an anti-conformist who wants to be diﬀerent from others (running
away from the Joneses). We allow, for example, an agent in a particular group feels
jealousy as to consumption of others in her group but admires consumption of agents
who belong to the other group. Such a situation may emerge, the agents in the rich
group admire an increase in the benchmark level of consumption in the poor group,
whereas they have jealousy as to the consumption level of other members in her own
group. In addition, the agent would be a conformist as to consumption behavior of
5her group’s members, but they like running away from consumption behavior of the
other group’s agents. As a result, even though there are only two types of agents,
the external eﬀects among the consumers cover a richer class of situations than that
treated in the representative-agent economy where external eﬀects are symmetric for
all agents.
As usual, the negative externality (jealousy) is expressed by ui
j (·)(= ∂ui/∂Cj−1) <
0 (i = 1,2, j = 2,3), while positive externality (admiration) means that ui
j (·) has a
positive value. Similarly, the consumers’ conformism is expressed by ui
1j (·)(= ∂2ui/∂Cj−1∂ci) >
0, and anti-conformism holds if ui
1j (·)(= ∂2ui/∂Cj−1∂ci) < 0. In what follows, we
assume that, regardless of the forms of external eﬀects, the eﬀect of a change in the
private consumption dominates the impact on her utility caused by external eﬀect.


































13(·) < 0, (2f)
where i = 1 and 2. Conditions (2a) and (2b) mean that the marginal utility of own
consumption dominates impacts produced by consumption externalities. Conditions
(2c) and (2d) show that the marginal utility of own consumption diminishes even in
the presence of external eﬀects. Conditions (2e) and (2f) ensure that, in a social
symmetric equilibrium C1 = C2, the marginal utility of consumption in a group is
positive and it monotonically decreases with private consumption.
The ﬂow budget constraint for each agent is
˙ ki = rki + w − ci, i = 1,2, (3)
6where, ki is capital stock owned by an agent in group i, ci consumption, ri the rate
of return to asset and wi the real wage rate. The initial holding of capital, ki (0), is
exogenously given.
Each household maximizes Ui subject to (3) and the initial holding of capital,
ki (0). Note that when selecting her optimal consumption plan, she takes the se-
quences of external eﬀects, {C1 (t),C2 (t)}
∞
t=0, as given. Letting the implicit price of
capital ki be qi, the optimization conditions include
U
i
1 (ci,Ci,Cj) = qi, i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j, (4)
˙ qi = qi (ρ − r), i = 1,2 (5)
along with the transversality condition, limt→∞ e−ρtqiki = 0.
Remember that households in each group are identical. Thus in equilibrium it
holds that Ci = ci (i = 1,2) for all t ≥ 0. Keeping this in mind, from (4) and (5) we






































, i = 1,2.
(7)
Here, Ωi
1 denotes the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption within the agent’s
own group, which equals the inverse of an elasticity of intertemporal substitution in
private consumption plus social consumption in its own group. This elasticity has
a positive value due to condition (2c). Additionally, Ωi
2 is the elasticity of marginal
utility with respect to the other group’s consumption. The sign of this term depends
on how group i agents respond to consumption of group j agents. If agents are
conformist to keep up with consumption of the other group’s members (so that ui
13
> 0), then Ωi
2 has a negative sign. On the other hand, if they do not like being
7similar to consumption behaviors of the other group (ui
13 < 0), then Ωi
2 is strictly





2 > 0, i = 1,2. (8)
2.2 Production
The representative ﬁrm produces a single good according to a constant-returns-to-
scale technology expressed by




Here, ¯ Y , ¯ K and N denote the total output, capital and labor, respectively. Using
the homogeneity assumption, we write the production function as follows:
Y = f (K),
where Y ≡ ¯ Y /N and K ≡ ¯ K/N. The production function, f (K), is assumed to be
monotonically increasing and strictly concave in capital-labor ratio, K, and fulﬁlls
the Inada conditions. The commodity market is assumed to be competitive so that
the before-tax rate of return to capital and real wage are respectively determined by
r = f
′(K), w = f(K) − Kf
′(K). (9)
For simplicity, we assume that capital does not depreciate.
If we denote the number of agents in group i by Ni (i = 1,2), then the full-
employment condition for labor and capital are:
N1 + N2 = N,
N1k1 + N2k2 = ¯ K.
Letting θi = Ni/N, the full-employment conditions are summarized as follows:
K = θ1k1 + θ2k2, , 0 ≤ θi ≤ 1, θ1 + θ2 = 1. (10)
For notational simplicity, in the following we normalize the total population, N, to
one. Thus θi represents the mass of agents of type i as well as the population share
of that type.
82.3 Dynamic System



























Second, (3) and (9) yield
˙ ki = f(K) + (ki − K)f
′(K) − Ci, i = 1,2. (12)
A complete dynamic system of our economy consists of (11) and (12) that describe
dynamic motions of (C1,C2, k1,k2).
It is worth noting that summing up the ﬂow budget constraints (12) over all of
the households and dividing the both sides by N, we obtain
θ1˙ k1 + θ2˙ k2 = f(K) − θ1C1 − θ2C2.
Thus, in view of (10), we obtain the ﬁnal-good market equilibrium condition for the
entire economy:
˙ K = f (K) − C,
where C = θ1C1 + θ2C2.
3 Steady-State Equilibrium
3.1 Steady-State Characterization
From (9) and (11) the steady-state level of aggregate capital, K∗, is determined by
the modiﬁed Golden-Rule condition such that
f
′(K








9Thus, taking account of (12), we see that the steady-state levels of consumption in









∗), i = 1,2. (15)
Notice that although the aggregate level of capital and consumption are uniquely
determined, the steady-state restriction does not pins down the steady-state levels
of individual capital stock, k∗
i. Obviously, the determination of k∗
i needs to specify
trajectory starting from a speciﬁc set of initial capital stocks k1 (0) and k2 (0).
3.2 Local Determinacy
As shown above, the steady-state levels of k1 and k2 are path dependent. Therefore,
if equilibrium determinacy holds in our setting, as to every set of k∗
1 and k∗
2, we can
ﬁnd a unique converging path to that particular point. Considering this fact, we
ﬁrst specify the steady-state levels of capital holding of each type of agent and then
inspect the presence of feasible set of initial distribution of capital that realizes the
selected capital holdings in the steady state.
We now select a particular set of steady-state levels of k∗
1 and k∗
2 that fulﬁll

























































−1 0 f′(K∗) + (k∗
1 − K∗)f′′(K∗)θ1 (k∗
1 − K∗)f′′(K∗)θ2
0 −1 (k∗
























Letting the eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient matrix in (16) be λj (j = 1,2,3,4), we ﬁnd
the following:





















10Proof. See Appendix A. 
Since there are two unpredetermined variables, C1 and C2, if the number of
unstable roots (i.e. roots with positive real parts) are two, then there may exist a
unique converging path towards the selected steady state. Lemma 1 shows that one
of the eigenvalues is zero, so that we should have one root with a negative real part
to establish local determinacy of equilibrium. Note that the presence of zero root
implies that the steady-state equilibrium is path dependent: it depends on the initial
position from which equilibrium path starts.3 Consequently, it is suﬃcient to focus



















If this has a negative value, we may establish local determinacy. For notational
simplicity, in the following we denote λ2 = λ.
To guarantee that λ has a negative value, we impose the following assumptions.4
























































2, then the sign of λ is negative. We will mention this case in section 5.
5See Appendix B for the derivation.
11γ31 =
λ − f′(K∗) − (k∗










−(f′(K∗) − λ)2 , (19b)
γ41 =
(k∗










−(f′(K∗) − λ)2 . (19c)







































where k1(0) and k2(0) are the initial levels of capital stock.
As a consequence, we can show the following result:
Proposition 1. The economy converges to the speciﬁed steady-state equilibrium if
and only if the initial capital holdings k1(0) and k2(0) satisfy A2 = 0.
Proof. When A2 = 0, conditions from (18a) to (18d) shows that limt→∞ ki(t) = k∗
i
and limt→∞ Ci(t) = C∗
i . Conversely, ki(t) converges k∗
i only if A2 = 0. 
4 Wealth Distribution
This section is devoted to explore the relation between consumption externalities
and the long-run distribution of wealth. In order to examine distributional dynamics
of our economy in an analytically tractable manner, we assume that Ω
j
i (i,j = 1,2)
in (7) are constant parameters.












, i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j. (21)
where γi denotes the inverse of elasticity of intertemporal substitution in felicity,
the parameter ϕi represents the extent of the intragroup consumption externalities,
whereas ηi shows the intensity of intergroup externalities. In this speciﬁcation, if
12ϕi(1 − γi) > (<)0, then individuals’ preference shows conformism (anti-conformism)
for the average level of consumption in the same group, whereas if ηi(1−γi) > (<)0,
it indicates conformism (anti-conformism) for the average level of consumption in
the diﬀerent group.6
4.1 Consumption Externalities and Capital Accumulation




2) are critical to determine the
direction of capital stock in respective groups towards the steady-state equilibrium.
Under the speciﬁed utility function (21), (Ω1
1 − Ω2
2) represents the divergence be-
tween the elasticity of intragroup marginal utility of type 1 agent and the elasticity
of intergroup marginal utility of type 2 agent. Similarly, (Ω2
1 − Ω1
2) denotes the di-
vergence between the elasticity of intragroup marginal utility of type 2 agent and the
elasticity of intergroup marginal utility of type 1 agent.7 Let us diﬀerentiate (18a)









6From conditions (2c) and (2f), the following inequalities must be satisﬁed:
Ωi
1 = γi − ϕi(1 − γi) > 0, i = 1,2,
Ωi
i + Ωi
j = γ1 − (ϕ1 + η1)(1 − γ1) > 0, i,j = 1,2, i ̸= j.











= γi − ηi(1 − γi) > 0, i = 1,2.















2 = γ1 − ϕ1(1 − γ1) + η2(1 − γ2),
Ω2
1 − Ω1
2 = γ2 − ϕ2(1 − γ2) + η1(1 − γ1).
13From (22a) and (22b), it can be easily conﬁrmed that whether or not the direction
of capital stock held by an agent in group 2 is the same with that in group 1 is de-
termined by the sign of γ21 alone. If there do not exist the intergroup consumption
externalities, both signs of Ω2
1 and Ω1
1 are positive, implying that the capital stocks
in each group converging each steady-state equilibrium move in the same direction
as time goes. More interestingly, when there exist the intergroup consumption ex-




2) is negative, the sign of γ21 is
negative. Hence, from (22a) and (22b) it is conﬁrmed that the capital stock held by
group 1 moves in the opposite direction to that in group 2.




2) are negative, assumption
1 does not hold. We shall discuss this case again in the next section.
In sum, we have shown:




2) > 0, then (k1(t) − k∗
1)(k2(t) − k∗
2) > 0





2) < 0, then (k1(t) − k∗
1)(k2(t) − k∗
2) < 0 for all t ≥ 0.
When we specify the initial level of aggregate capital, we may present a more
detailed discussion on the behaviors of the average capital of each group.





2) > 0, then
dk1(t)





























2) > 0, then
dk1(t)






































where the sign of the denominator is positive due to Assumption 1.
14Assume that K(0) < K∗. In this case, if Ω2
1 > Ω1
2, then A1 < 0 in (23). This
means that from (22a),
dk1(t)
dt > 0 where we impose A2 = 0. In addition, if Ω1
1 > Ω2
2
so that γ21 > 0, from (22b)
dk2(t)
dt > 0. That is, both groups’ capital stocks move in





2, then A1 < 0 and γ21 < 0. In this case, from (22a)
and (22b) we can show that
dk1(t)
dt > 0 and
dk2(t)
dt < 0. This means that both groups’
capital stocks move in the opposite directions.
Making use of the similar procedure, we can obtain the other results.
4.2 Initial Distribution and the Steady State
As easily conﬁrmed by (18a) − (18d), if the condition A2 = 0 is not satisﬁed, this
economy cannot have a stable path that converges to the steady-state equilibrium.
From (20b), A2 = 0 gives a set of the initial capital holding (k1(0),k2(0)) that achieves
the steady-state equilibrium (k∗
1,k∗
2).
We ﬁrst consider the relationship between the initial level of capital held by each
type of household and the steady-state distribution of wealth. Notice that from
(13) and (15) the steady-state level of consumption of a group i agents is shown by
C∗
i ≡ w∗+ρk∗
i where w∗ ≡ f(K∗)−K∗f′(K∗)(> 0). Since K∗ (= f′−1 (ρ)) is uniquely












































The steady-state level of capital stock held by group 2 agents is determined by (24).
We note that if k∗
1 = k∗
2 in the steady-state equilibrium, then these levels are
given by K∗ (= k∗
1 = k∗
























2) > 0 (< 0) for all 0 < k∗
2 < K∗
θ2 .
Proof. First, substituting k∗
2 = K∗, k∗
































2) with respect to k∗














Thus, we can conﬁrm that Ψ′(k∗






2 > (<)0. 
4.3 Consumption Externalities and Stationary Distribution
To make our argument clear, this subsection assumes that the initial levels of capital
stock in both groups are the same: k1(0) = k2(0).8 If this is the case, (10) shows that
K(0) = k1(0) = k2(0) where K(0) ≡ θ1k1(0) + θ2k2(0). Hence, our central concern
in this subsection is to explore how the presence of consumption externalities aﬀects
the long-run wealth distribution between the households who hold the same amount






In this case, Lemma 2 means that Ψ(k∗
2) > 0 and Ψ′(k∗







We now consider the shape of Γ(k∗
2). Since Ψ(k∗







to hold that Γ(k∗







2) > 0, we see that the following two sub-cases
hold:
Case (i-a) : k
∗








, i = 1,2
Case (i-b) : k
∗









It is to be noted that the slope of Γ(k∗








8In the next section, we shall mention the case that k1(0) ̸= k2(0).
16Thus, the slope of Γ(k∗
2) is positive in case (i-a), while it is negative in case (i-b).
Figures 1 and 2 depict the graphs of two functions Ψ(k∗
2) and Γ(k∗
2). These
graphs use the facts that Γ(K∗) = 1(> 0) and Γ(K(0)) = 0. Figure 1 assumes
that K∗ > K(0) so that from (26) Γ(k∗
2) has a positive slope, whereas Figure 2
imposes the inequality K∗ < K(0) and thus Γ(k∗
2) has a negative slope. As depicted
in Figures 1 and 2, the graph of Γ(k∗
2) always intersects line Ψ(k∗
2) = 0 only once,





2.9 For instance, Figure 1 shows that point B1 is above point A1 where point
A1 is the intersection between Γ(k∗
2) and k∗
2 = K∗, and point B1 is the intersection
between Ψ(k∗
2) and k∗
2 = K∗. Those imply that the crosspoint E1 is in the region
k∗
2 > K∗. As a result, from (14) we can conclude that k∗
2 > K∗ > k∗
1. Conversely,
if point B1 is below point A1, the crosspoint E1 would be in the region k∗
2 < K∗ so
that k∗
2 < K∗ < k∗
1. In other words, whether point A1 is above or below point B1
determines patterns of wealth distribution in the steady state.
Consequently, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. When K∗ > K(0) (i = 1,2), it holds that
k∗
2 > K∗ > k∗






1 > K∗ > k∗





When K∗ < K(0) (i = 1,2), it holds that
k1(0) = k2(0) > k∗






k1(0) = k2(0) > k∗






Proof. To prove the case where K∗ > K(0), let us make use of Figure 1.10 When




2) as shown in Figure 1, the level of group
2’s capital stock in the equilibrium E1 is greater than the level of K∗, implying
that K(0) < k∗
1 < K∗ < k∗





2), we can show that K(0) < k∗
2 < K∗ < k∗
1. On the other hand,
















2 > K in case (i-a).





2) so that the level of group 2’s capital stock in the equilibrium
E2 is lower than that of K∗. That is, it holds that k∗
2 < K∗ < k∗
1 < K(0). If





1 < K∗ < k∗
2 < K(0). 
Case (ii): sign (Ω2
1 − Ω1
2) = −sign (Ω1
1 − Ω2
2)











0.12 In this case, from Lemma 2 Ψ(k∗
2) < 0 and Ψ′ (k∗
2) < 0 for all k∗
2 ∈ [0, K∗
θ2 ].
When considering the shape of Γ(k∗









































w∗ (< 0). (27d)
Comparing these values, we can obtain the following four sub-cases: case (ii-a):






























































































































2)θ2 < 0, there does not exist the stable root in this case. Hence,

























Assume that K∗ > K(0). This means that from (26) the slope of Γ(k∗
2) is positive.
Figure 3 depicts case (ii-a). As conﬁrmed in Figure 3, taking account of the positive
slope of Γ(k∗
2), the number of intersection that satisﬁes Γ(k∗
2) = Ψ(k∗
2) is two in case
(ii-a). It is also seen that the number of the intersection in cases (ii-b) and (ii-c) is
one. In addition, there is no intersection in case (ii-d). Alternatively, if K∗ < K(0)
so that the slope of Γ(k∗
2) is negative, then the relationship is reversed. That is, we
ﬁnd: there is no intersection in case (ii-a); there are two intersections in case (ii-d),
and; there is one intersection in cases (ii-b) and (ii-c).







wealth distribution can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 3. When K∗ > K(0), it holds that
Case (ii-a): k∗
1 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
2 or k∗
2 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
1;
Case (ii-b): k∗
2 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
1;
Case (ii-c): k∗
1 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
2.
On the other hand, when K∗ < K(0), it holds that
Case(ii-b): k∗
1 > K(0) > K∗ > k∗
2;
Case (ii-c): k∗
2 > K(0) > K∗ > k∗
1;
Case (ii-d): k∗
1 > K(0) > K∗ > k∗
2 or k∗
2 > K(0) > K∗ > k∗
1.
















2) determine the dynamic behavior of capital stock held by each group,
we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 5. When K∗ > K(0), the following relations are established:












2 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
1,











2, then there is no converging path towards the
19steady state,











2, then there is no converging path towards the
steady state,
Case (ii-d): there is no converging path towards the steady state,
When K∗ < K(0), the following relations are established:
Case (ii-a): there is no converging path towards the steady state,











2, then there is no converging path towards the
steady state,











2, then there is no converging path towards the
steady state,












2 > K(0) > K∗ > k∗
1.

















2 is in the
range in case (ii-a) or case (ii-c). Considering that γ21 < 0 in (19a) and A1 < 0 in
(23), from (22a) and (22b) the level of capital stock of group 1 monotonically increases
and the level of group 2’s capital stock decreases during the transition, implying that
there exists a steady-state equilibrium that satisﬁes k∗
1 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
2.










2 < 0 in case (ii-a) or in case (ii-b). In this case, since the level of capital
stock of group 1 decreases and that of capital stock of group 2 increases, there is
the steady-state equilibrium with k∗
2 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
1. Making use of the same
procedure, we can show the other results in the case that K∗ < K(0).
From Propositions 4 and 5 we obtain intuitive explanations about the relation-
ship between wealth distribution and consumption externalities. First, we consider
the eﬀect of the intragroup consumption externalities on wealth distribution. The
intragroup consumption externalities only produce quantitative eﬀects: although the
20intragroup consumption externalities cause the diﬀerence of wealth distribution in
the long run, the capital stock held by each group converges to the steady state from
the same direction. Assume that there do not exist the intergroup consumption ex-
ternalities (i.e., Ω2
2 = Ω1
2 = 0) so that there exist Ω1
1(> 0) and Ω2
1(> 0) alone. From
Proposition 3, this case shows that if K∗ > K(0) (resp. K∗ < K(0)), the capital
stocks held by both groups monotonically increase (resp. decrease). In addition, for
simplicity, we assume that the pure elasticities of the marginal utility of own con-





















1 . We now consider the case that K∗ > K(0),
meaning that f′(K(t)) > ρ for all t. For instance, if individuals’ preference of group















C2(t)(> 0). That is, because the agents in group 1 save more than
the agents in group 2, the long-run level of capital stock in group 1 is larger than that
in group 2, that is, k∗
1 > K∗ > k∗
2 > K(0) = k1(0) = k2(0). This result corresponds
to the conclusion in Proposition 4. In contrast, if individuals’ preference in group 1












2 > K∗ > k∗
1 > K(0) = k1(0) = k2(0).
Next, suppose that there are intergroup as well as intragroup consumption exter-





2) can be negative.13 Then, the presence of the intergroup consumption
externalities may yield not only quantitative but also qualitative diﬀerences in dy-
namic behaviors of capital stock held by each group. More speciﬁcally, the qualitative
impact of consumption externalities is demonstrated by the fact that the dynamic
behavior of capital stock held by one group is opposite to that of the other group’s




2. Noting that both Ω1
1 and
Ω2
1 have positive signs, this case may hold if there is intergroup conformism among





1 (< 0)) so that Ω2
1 > Ω1
2, while if group 2’s agents





1 (> 0)) so that Ω1
1 < Ω2
2. As shown












are negative in the
next section.





that the level of capital stock held by group 1 monotonically increases and group 2’s
capital stock monotonically decreases. Furthermore, taking account of the dynamic
equations of consumption, we can show that
˙ C1(t)
C1(t) > 0 >
˙ C2(t)
C2(t). In addition, when the
condition A2 = 0 is imposed, we can conﬁrm whether there is a stable steady-state






2. If cases (ii-a) and (ii-c) hold, the
steady-state wealth distribution is characterized by k∗
1 > K∗ > K(0) > k∗
2. Fur-
thermore, if the population size is the same in both groups θ1 = θ2, the diﬀerence
between k∗
1 and k1(0)(= K(0)) is larger than that between k∗
2 and k2(0)(= K(0)).
Namely, wealth inequality will be enhanced during the transition.
Finally, because of the presence of the intergroup consumption externalities, we






2 < 0. For example, if




2, then there is no feasible steady state equilibrium
in cases (ii-b) and (ii-d). This fact is also a qualitative eﬀect generated by the
introduction of heterogeneous consumers.
5 Discussion
5.1 The Euler Equations and Consumption Externalities
We have examined the relationship between the wealth distribution and consump-





2) are critical to characterize the rela-
tionship. In this subsection, making use of the Euler equations, we present intuitive
implication of our ﬁndings displayed above.
First, note that if intergroup externalities do not exist, the Euler equations for







(r − ρ), i = 1,2
where 1
Ωi










, which indicates the partial elasticity of intertemporal sub-
stitution in consumption from the intragroup perspective. In this case, a higher
22degree of intragroup conformism, i.e. ui
12 > 0, increases 1/Ωi
1, which accelerates
consumption growth of each group. Therefore, if there is no intergroup consump-
tion externalities, the consumption conformism (resp. anti-conformism) enhances
(diminishes) current savings and promotes capital accumulation. Hence, in the ab-
sence of intergroup externalities, we may conclude that although wealth distribution
aﬀects aggregate dynamics, transitional behavior of our economy is close to that of
the representative-agent economy with consumption externalities.
Once we consider the intergroup consumption externalities, we ﬁnd a much richer







(r − ρ), i = 1,2
where


























































Notice that the social marginal utility of own consumption including intragroup
external eﬀect is decreasing regardless of the sign of ui
12 (i.e., Ω1
1 > 0 and Ω2
1 > 0).
The preference parameters Ω1
2 and Ω2
2 express the partial elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption from the intergroup perspective. Note that when the
elasticities of substitution from the intragroup perspective dominate those from the
intergroup perspective, ˆ Ω has a positive value. Conversely, if agents in each group
are more sensitive to the consumption of the other group, ˆ Ω could be negative.
The elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption including the inter-
group consumption externalities is given by αi/ˆ Ω. Unlike the intragroup consumption
externalities alone, when the intergroup consumption externalities are incorporated,
we need to consider the eﬀect of the intergroup consumption externalities on the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption through ˆ Ω and αi.
23We ﬁrst consider the eﬀect on ˆ Ω. For simplicity, we assume that the sign of ˆ Ω is
positive. In this case, if Ω1
2 and Ω2
2 have the same signs and both become larger, then
ˆ Ω decreases, which is likely to enhance consumption growth in respective groups. In
contrast, if agents in one group have conformism with respect to the other group’s
consumption but the other group’s members have intergroup anti-conformism, then
Ω1
2Ω2
2 < 0. Thus when these intergroup external eﬀects are large enough, ˆ Ω has a
larger value, which will depress consumption growth. As a result, we see that, as
long as ˆ Ω takes a positive value, the rate of consumption growth of each group is
higher when both groups have the same type of sentiment about the other group’s
consumption behavior. In other words, other things being equal, the homogeneity of
preference in the society at large tends to accelerate capital accumulation.
The actual value of consumption adjustment speed, however, depends on the
magnitude of αi as well. Assume that αi (i = 1,2) take positive values. Then, we
ﬁnd that the positive sign of ui
13 (i = 1,2) leads to an increase in the growth rate of
consumption, while the negative sign of ui
13 lowers it. As a result, we can conclude
that when the agents in each group are conformists as for group’s consumption
behavior, consumption growth is enhanced.
The above discussion deals with the case that ˆ Ω > 0 and αi > 0 so that there is
no qualitative eﬀect generated by the intergroup consumption externalities. Namely,
when αi > 0 (i = 1,2) so that αi/ˆ Ω > 0, the behaviors of optimal consumption of each
group are similar to the case where there is no intergroup externalities; however, if
αi < 0 (i = 1,2) and ˆ Ω > 0, dynamics of consumption and capital may show explicit
qualitative diﬀerences. In this case, even if we restrict our attention to the normal
case where ˆ Ω > 0, the consumption (so savings) behavior of each group takes the
opposite directions. As an example, suppose that α1 < 0 and α2 > 0. This situation
holds, if agents in group 1 has a strong degree of conformism towards the group 2
such that the sign of α1 is negative. In this case a rise in the real rate of return to
capital, r, depresses consumption growth of agents in group 1 and thus their capital
formation is lowered. If such an impact is large enough, the steady-state equilibrium
24could be unstable.14
5.2 Alternative Initial Conditions
In Section 3 we restrict our attention to the case where the initial capital holding of
each type of agent is identical. This restriction means that Γ(K∗) = 1 in (24) under





2) alone: see Propositions 4 and 5. Here, we brieﬂy discuss the case
where k1 (0) ̸= k2 (0). Since Γ(K∗) =
k2(0)−K∗
k1(0)−K∗, how the wealth is distributed in the
long run is determined by the initial holdings of capital stock in respective groups





even if assuming k1(0) ̸= k2(0), the behavior of capital stock from the initial period













2 > 0, capital stocks of both






2 < 0, the behavior of capital stock
in a group is opposite to that of the other groups.
Note that the wealth distribution depends on the initial holdings of capital stock





2. In addition, assume that the steady-state levels of capital stock in both
groups are greater than those of capital stock at initial period k∗
i > ki(0) and that
the steady-state level of capital stock in group 2 is greater than that of group 1. In








1 . Comparing it with the condition in Proposition 4, we





2), the large diﬀerence between k1(0)−k∗
1 and the small
diﬀerence between k2(0)−k∗
2 would produce the long-run wealth distribution in such
a way that k∗
2 > K∗ > k∗
1. Furthermore, if the preference shows the strong KUJ in
14One may consider the case that if ˆ Ω < 0 and αi < 0 (i = 1,2), the economy moves towards the
steady-state equilibrium. In this case, the stability of the economy may be indeterminate as shown
in Mino and Nakamoto (2008) where the paper incorporates the progressive taxation to guarantee
the unique steady state.
25group 2 so that the diﬀerence of the initial levels of capital stock is not critical for
the determination of wealth distribution, we may conﬁrm that individuals in group
2 become rich in the long run relative to the other group although they are poor in
the initial period. This means that k2(0) < k1(0) < k∗
1 < k∗
2.




2) is negative, the behavior of
capital stock in a group is opposite to that of the other group. Therefore, it may
hold that k∗
1 < k2(0) < k1(0) < k∗
2. Individuals in group 1 initially become rich, but
their capital stock decreases over time and they ﬁnally become poor. In contrast,
individuals in group 2 are initially poor, but continuing increase in their capital
makes them relatively rich in the steady-state equilibrium.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied how the presence of consumption externalities aﬀects
macroeconomic stability and stationary wealth distribution in a neoclassical growth
model with heterogeneous households. We have distinguished intragroup external-
ities form intergroup external eﬀects in order to examine the role of asymmetric
external eﬀects among the agents. Our ﬁndings reveal that the long-run distribution
of wealth is highly sensitive to the strength of conformism (or anti-conformism) as
to intragroup as well as to intragroup comparison of consumption levels.
Our central concern is to show that consumption externalities would play a more
prominent role in the economy with heterogeneous agents than in the representative-
agent counterpart. We thus have focused on the distributional eﬀect of consumption
externalities and have not discussed policy implications in detail. Our next task is
to study the policy impacts, in particular, the eﬀect of redistribution policies, in our
setting.
26Appendices


















































Hence, we can obtain the eigenvalues given by (17).
Appendix B.
















−1 0 f′(K∗) + (k∗
1 − K∗)f′′(K∗)θ1 − λ (k∗
1 − K∗)f′′(K∗)θ2
0 −1 (k∗
2 − K∗)f′′(K∗)θ1 f′(K∗) + (k∗













































































∗)θ2 − λ}γ41 = 0. (B.2d)
First, using {(B.2a) × Π2 − (B.2b) × Π1}, we can show that
λ(Π2 − γ21Π1) = 0. (B.3)





Furthermore, using (B.2c) and (B.2d), we can derive γ31 and γ41 where γ21 =
Π2
Π1
in (19b) and (19c).
Next, in the case of zero–root, we only substitute λ = 0 into equations (B.2a) −






































∗)θ2}γ42 = 0. (B.5d)
From (B.5a) and (B.5c), we can obtain γ32 = 1
f′(K∗) and γ42 = −
θ1
θ2f′(K∗), respec-
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32Figure 3: The case (ii-a)
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